--- title: AWS Rare Source AS Organization Activity description: Surfaces an AWS identity whose successful API traffic is dominated by a small set of large cloud-provider source AS organization labels, yet also shows... url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/integrations/aws/initial_access_aws_api_unusual_asn products: - Elastic Security --- # AWS Rare Source AS Organization Activity Surfaces an AWS identity whose successful API traffic is dominated by a small set of large cloud-provider source AS organization labels, yet also shows a very small share of traffic from other AS organization names—including at least one sensitive control-plane, credential, storage, or model-invocation action on that uncommon network path with recent activity from the uncommon path. The intent is to highlight disproportionate “baseline” cloud egress versus sparse use from rarer networks on the same principal, a shape that can appear when automation or CI credentials are reused or pivoted outside their usual hosted-cloud footprint. **Rule type**: esql **Rule indices**: **Rule Severity**: high **Risk Score**: 73 **Runs every**: 1h **Searches indices from**: `now-7d` **Maximum alerts per execution**: 100 **References**: - [[https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference.html)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference.html) **Tags**: - Domain: Cloud - Data Source: AWS - Data Source: Amazon Web Services - Data Source: AWS CloudTrail - Use Case: Threat Detection - Tactic: Initial Access - Resources: Investigation Guide - Noise: Low - Performance: Slow - Rule Type: ES|QL - Platform: AWS **Version**: 2 **Rule authors**: - Elastic **Rule license**: Elastic License v2 ## Investigation guide ## Triage and analysis ### Investigating AWS Rare Source AS Organization Activity After High Cloud-Provider Volume The rule aggregates roughly seven days of successful CloudTrail per `user.name` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type`. It expects a **high count** of events whose GeoIP AS organization matches a short allowlist of large cloud/SaaS providers, **at least one** event from a different AS organization, a **low ratio** of uncommon-network events to all events, few **distinct** uncommon AS labels, and **recent** uncommon-network timestamps. It further requires at least one **sensitive** API from an uncommon network (see query `event.action` list). #### Possible investigation steps - Compare `Esql.src_asn_values` to `Esql.user_agent_values` and map each `source.ip` (from raw CloudTrail) to expected admin paths, pipelines, or offices. - Pivot on `user.name` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` (from underlying events) for IAM, STS, S3, and Secrets Manager activity around `Esql.most_recent_low_asn_day`. - Confirm whether the identity is meant for automation only; if so, rare human ISP ASNs warrant higher scrutiny. - Review `Esql.untrusted_suspicious_actions` for the mix of discovery versus privilege-changing APIs. ### False positive analysis - **Threshold sensitivity**: Raise `Esql.trusted_cloud_event_count` or Lower `Esql.rare_asn_ratio` and `Esql.untrusted_event_count` if legitimate rare-ASN noise persists. - **MongoDB / other allowlist labels**: Extend `is_trusted_cloud` if your approved automation consistently appears under another legal-entity string. ### Response and remediation - If abuse is plausible: rotate credentials for the principal, enforce OIDC or short-lived keys for automation, and tighten IAM and data-plane permissions. ### Additional information - [CloudTrail user identity](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-user-identity.html) ## Rule Query ```esql FROM logs-aws.cloudtrail-* | WHERE event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail" AND event.outcome == "success" AND source.as.organization.name IS NOT NULL AND user.name IS NOT NULL | EVAL is_trusted_cloud = CASE( source.as.organization.name LIKE "Amazon*" OR source.as.organization.name == "Google LLC" OR source.as.organization.name == "Microsoft Corporation" OR source.as.organization.name == "MongoDB, Inc.", true, false ) | EVAL is_suspicious_action = CASE( event.action IN ( "GetCallerIdentity", "GetAccountSummary", "ListAccountAliases", "GetSecretValue", "ListSecrets", "DescribeSecret", "GetParameter", "GetParameters", "GetParametersByPath", "AssumeRole", "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity", "AssumeRoleWithSAML", "AttachUserPolicy", "AttachRolePolicy", "PutUserPolicy", "PutRolePolicy", "CreateAccessKey", "UpdateAccessKey", "CreateUser", "CreateLoginProfile", "UpdateLoginProfile", "AddUserToGroup", "GetObject", "ListBuckets", "ListObjects", "ListObjectsV2", "InvokeModel", "InvokeModelWithResponseStream", "Converse" ), true, false ) // Single aggregation — full event count preserved for ratio logic // suspicious action tracking is additive on top | STATS Esql.total_events_all_asns = COUNT(*), Esql.count_distinct_asns = COUNT_DISTINCT(source.as.organization.name), Esql.src_asn_values = VALUES(source.as.organization.name), Esql.user_agent_values = VALUES(user_agent.original), Esql.related_users = VALUES(user.changes.name), Esql.source_ip_values = VALUES(source.address), Esql.has_trusted_cloud_asn = MAX(is_trusted_cloud), Esql.trusted_cloud_event_count = SUM(CASE(is_trusted_cloud == true, 1, 0)), Esql.untrusted_event_count = SUM(CASE(is_trusted_cloud == false, 1, 0)), // Suspicious action visibility from untrusted ASNs — informational only, not a filter Esql.untrusted_suspicious_count = SUM(CASE( is_trusted_cloud == false AND is_suspicious_action == true, 1, 0 )), Esql.untrusted_suspicious_actions = VALUES(CASE( is_trusted_cloud == false AND is_suspicious_action == true, event.action, null )), Esql.most_recent_low_asn_day = MAX(CASE( is_trusted_cloud == false, @timestamp, null )) BY user.name, aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type | EVAL Esql.rare_asn_ratio = TO_DOUBLE(Esql.untrusted_event_count) / TO_DOUBLE(Esql.total_events_all_asns), Esql.unique_action_from_untrusted_asn = MV_COUNT(Esql.untrusted_suspicious_actions) // Detection thresholds — unchanged, full event counts drive the logic | WHERE Esql.has_trusted_cloud_asn == true AND Esql.untrusted_event_count >= 1 AND Esql.trusted_cloud_event_count >= 100 AND Esql.rare_asn_ratio <= 0.01 AND Esql.unique_action_from_untrusted_asn >= 2 AND Esql.count_distinct_asns <= 5 AND Esql.most_recent_low_asn_day >= NOW() - 1 hour | KEEP user.name, aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type, Esql.* ``` **Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK - Tactic: - Name: Initial Access - Id: TA0001 - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/) - Technique: - Name: Valid Accounts - Id: T1078 - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/) - Sub Technique: - Name: Cloud Accounts - Id: T1078.004 - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/)