---
title: Entra ID Windows Hello for Business Credential Registered
description: Identifies the first-seen registration of a Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) credential for a Microsoft Entra ID user from a given source ASN in a tenant,...
url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/integrations/azure/persistence_entra_id_whfb_credential_registration
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Entra ID Windows Hello for Business Credential Registered
Identifies the first-seen registration of a Windows Hello for Business (WHfB) credential for a Microsoft Entra ID user
from a given source ASN in a tenant, based on a prefixed historic window. Enrollment is commonly part of legitimate
onboarding or passwordless rollout and is not inherently malicious. Adversaries who have obtained a token that satisfies
fresh (NGC) multi-factor authentication, for example by borrowing an existing WHfB key or passkey, can also enroll their
own WHfB credential to establish durable, phishing-resistant persistence that survives password resets and standard
session revocation. Correlate first-seen enrollments with the sign-in and device state that preceded them.
**Rule type**: new_terms
**Rule indices**:
- logs-azure.auditlogs-*

**Rule Severity**: low
**Risk Score**: 21
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://dirkjanm.io/borrowing-windows-hello-keys/](https://dirkjanm.io/borrowing-windows-hello-keys/)](https://dirkjanm.io/borrowing-windows-hello-keys/)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Cloud
- Domain: Identity
- Platform: Entra ID
- Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Rule Type: New Terms
- Data Source: Azure
- Data Source: Entra ID Audit Logs
- Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID
- Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs
- Resources: Investigation Guide

**Version**: 2
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

#### Required Microsoft Entra ID Audit Logs

This rule requires the Azure integration with Microsoft Entra ID Audit logs enabled and collected via Azure Event Hub.

## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Entra ID Windows Hello for Business Credential Registered

This is a first-seen (new_terms) signal: a WHfB credential was registered for a tenant/user/source-ASN combination not observed in the prior 14 days. Enrollment is often legitimate onboarding, but adversaries abuse the same action as persistence - after borrowing an existing WHfB key or passkey to satisfy fresh MFA, they enroll their own credential, which survives password resets and ordinary session revocation.

### Possible investigation steps

- Identify the target (`target_resources.0.user_principal_name`) and initiator (`initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName`), confirm whether WHfB enrollment was expected, and check whether the source ASN is new for that user.
- Correlate with `azure.signinlogs` shortly before for a deviceless WHfB/passkey sign-in, device-code flow, or attacker device registration/PRT issuance; an additional credential from a new ASN on an established account is more suspicious. Examine the preceding sign-in's source IP/geo and user agent for automation or hosting/VPS origins.


### False positive analysis

- First-time WHfB enrollment during onboarding/passwordless rollout is expected; repeat enrollments from the same tenant/user/ASN within 14 days don't fire.
- Users traveling or switching ISP/VPN may appear as a new ASN - validate against known networks before treating as suspicious.


### Response and remediation

- If unauthorized, delete the WHfB credential and any attacker-registered device via Graph or the Entra portal, revoke sessions and refresh tokens (delete devices first, to break device-bound PRT persistence), reset credentials, and re-enroll from a trusted device.
- Review the sign-in that authorized the enrollment to determine the initial access vector.


## Rule Query

```kuery
data_stream.dataset: "azure.auditlogs" and
    azure.auditlogs.operation_name: "Add Windows Hello for Business credential" and
    event.outcome: ("Success" or "success") and
    azure.tenant_id: * and
    azure.auditlogs.properties.initiated_by.user.userPrincipalName: * and
    source.as.number: *
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Persistence
  - Id: TA0003
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Account Manipulation
  - Id: T1098
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Additional Cloud Credentials
  - Id: T1098.001
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/)