---
title: Remote Management Access Launch After MSI Install
description: Detects an MSI installer execution followed by the execution of commonly abused Remote Management Software like ScreenConnect. This behavior may indicate...
url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/command_and_control_rmm_after_msi_install
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Remote Management Access Launch After MSI Install
Detects an MSI installer execution followed by the execution of commonly abused Remote Management Software like ScreenConnect.
This behavior may indicate abuse where an attacker triggers an MSI install then connects via a guest link with a known session key.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- endgame-*
- logs-crowdstrike.fdr*
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
- logs-m365_defender.event-*
- logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*
- logs-system.security*
- logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
- winlogbeat-*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Command and Control
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Data Source: Sysmon
- Data Source: SentinelOne
- Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR
- Data Source: Crowdstrike
- Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Noise: Low
- Performance: Normal
- Profile: Recommended
- Threat: Remote Management Tool Abuse
- Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)
- Platform: Windows

**Version**: 6
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Setup

This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
Setup instructions: [https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend](https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend)

### Additional data sources

This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
- [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
- [Windows Process Creation Logs](https://ela.st/audit-process-creation)


## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Remote Management Access Launch After MSI Install

This rule fires when the same host runs msiexec with an install argument (/i) and within one minute starts a pre-configured RMM software.

### Possible investigation steps

- Confirm the sequence on the host: first event should be msiexec.exe with process.args containing "/i"; second should be a remote management software.
- Review the source of the MSI file using file events.
- Check whether use of RMM software is approved for this host.
- Check network events to validate which remote host the RMM software connects to.
- Correlate with other alerts for the same host (initial access, persistence, C2).


### False positive analysis

- Legitimate IT/MSP deployment of RMM for support.


### Response and remediation

- If unauthorized RMM use or abuse is confirmed: isolate the host, terminate the ScreenConnect client, remove or block the installation, and investigate how the MSI was delivered and who operates the relay.


## Rule Query

```eql
sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "msiexec.exe" and 
  process.args : ("/i*", "-i*") and process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "sihost.exe", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe")]
 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
  (
   (process.name : "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" and process.command_line : "*?e=Access&y=Guest&h*&k=*") or
   (process.name : "Syncro.Installer.exe" and process.args : "--config-json" and process.args : "--key") or 
    process.name : ("tvnserver.exe", "winvnc.exe") 
  )]
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Command and Control
  - Id: TA0011
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Remote Access Tools
  - Id: T1219
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Remote Desktop Software
  - Id: T1219.002
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/)