---
title: Suspicious Shell Execution via Velociraptor
description: Detects shell executions (cmd, PowerShell, rundll32) spawned by Velociraptor. Threat actors have been observed installing Velociraptor to execute shell...
url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/command_and_control_velociraptor_shell_execution
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Suspicious Shell Execution via Velociraptor
Detects shell executions (cmd, PowerShell, rundll32) spawned by Velociraptor. Threat actors have been observed
installing Velociraptor to execute shell commands on compromised systems, blending in with legitimate system processes.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- endgame-*
- logs-crowdstrike.fdr*
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
- logs-m365_defender.event-*
- logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*
- logs-system.security*
- logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
- winlogbeat-*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://www.huntress.com/blog/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk-cve-2025-26399](https://www.huntress.com/blog/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk-cve-2025-26399)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk-cve-2025-26399)
- [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Command and Control
- Tactic: Execution
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Data Source: Sysmon
- Data Source: SentinelOne
- Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR
- Data Source: Crowdstrike
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs
- Noise: Low
- Performance: Normal
- Profile: Recommended
- Threat: Living off the Land
- Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)
- Platform: Windows

**Version**: 5
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Setup

This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
Setup instructions: [https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend](https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend)

### Additional data sources

This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
- [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
- [Windows Process Creation Logs](https://ela.st/audit-process-creation)


## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Suspicious Shell Execution via Velociraptor

Velociraptor is a legitimate endpoint visibility and response tool. Threat actors have been observed deploying it on compromised systems to run shell commands (cmd, PowerShell, rundll32), making their activity look like normal Velociraptor-collector behavior.

### Possible investigation steps

- Confirm the parent process name matches a Velociraptor binary (e.g. velociraptor.exe, Velociraptor.exe) and the child is cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe.
- Review the child process command line for suspicious or interactive commands (e.g. download, lateral movement, credential access) versus known Velociraptor artifact scripts (Get-LocalGroupMember, Get-Date, registry queries, Velociraptor Tools module).
- Identify how Velociraptor was installed (dropped by another process, scheduled task, service); correlate with earlier process or file events on the host.
- Check whether the Velociraptor executable path and code signature are expected (e.g. Program Files vs. temp or user writable); unauthorized installs are often from non-standard paths.
- Correlate with other alerts for the same host or user (initial access, persistence, C2) to determine if this is abuse vs. legitimate IR/DFIR use.


### False positive analysis

- Legitimate Velociraptor artifacts that run Get-LocalGroupMember, Get-Date, registry Run key checks, or Velociraptor Tools PowerShell module are excluded by the rule; remaining FPs may be custom artifacts. Allowlist by command-line pattern or host if you use Velociraptor for authorized IR and see known-good artifacts.


### Response and remediation

- If abuse is confirmed: isolate the host, terminate the Velociraptor and child shell processes, and remove the Velociraptor installation (binary, service, config).
- Determine how Velociraptor was deployed and close the initial access vector; rotate credentials for affected accounts.
- If the deployment was authorized (IR/DFIR), document and tune the rule or add an exception to reduce noise.


## Rule Query

```eql
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.command_line != null and
 process.parent.name : "velociraptor.exe" and
 process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe") and
 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.command_line : "*RwBlAHQALQBMAG8AYwBhAGwARwByAG8AdQBwAE0AZQBtAGIAZQBy*") and
 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.command_line : "*RwBlAHQALQBEAGEAdABl*" and process.command_line : "*-Format*") and
 not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "*start*127.0.0.1:8889*") and
 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.command_line : "*RwBlAHQALQBJAHQAZQBt*" and process.command_line : "*UgBlAGcAaQBzAHQAcgB5*" and process.command_line : "*UgB1AG4A*") and
 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and
      process.args : ("RwBlAHQALQ*", "UgBlAG0AbwB2AGUALQBJAHQAZQBtACA*", "C:\\Program Files\\Velociraptor\\thor.db",
                      "import-module \"C:\\Program Files\\Velociraptor\\Tools\\*"))
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Command and Control
  - Id: TA0011
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Remote Access Tools
  - Id: T1219
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Remote Desktop Software
  - Id: T1219.002
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Defense Evasion
  - Id: TA0005
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)
- Technique:
  - Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
  - Id: T1218
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Rundll32
  - Id: T1218.011
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Execution
  - Id: TA0002
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
  - Id: T1059
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: PowerShell
  - Id: T1059.001
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Windows Command Shell
  - Id: T1059.003
  - Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/)